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The prevailing interpretation of constituent power is taken to be the extra-institutional 
capacity of a group, typically ‘the people’, to establish or revise the basic constitutional conditions 
of a state. Among many contemporary democratic theorists, this is understood as a collective 
capacity for innovation. This paper excavates an alternative perspective from constituent power’s 
genealogy. I argue that constituent power is not a creative material power, but is a type of political 
claim that shapes the collective rights, responsibilities and identity of ‘the people’. I do so by 
recovering Thomas Hobbes’s intervention into debates over constituent power among Scottish 
Presbyterians during the English Civil War. Though a materialist, Hobbes appreciated the centrality 
of the imagination to politics, and he argued that constituent power was one such phantasm of the 
mind. In Leviathan, he showed constituent power not to be a material power, but a world-making 
fiction that furnished political realities with ornamentation of the imagination, which might provide 
the beliefs and justifications to serve any number of political ends. More generally, the retrieval of a 
Hobbesian constituent power provides an important challenge to contemporary theories by 
demonstrating how partisan constructions of constituent power shape the political options available 
to groups. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Thomas Hobbes, Constituent Power, imagination, the People, representation, democratic theory 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
For comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Michael Freeden, Duncan Kelly, 
Helen McCabe, Chris Pierson and Mark Wenman. For his persistence with several such drafts, 
special thanks go to Ben Holland. I would also like to thank Lawrie Balfour and the anonymous 
reviewers for their productive feedback.  
  
 - 2 - 
 
 
‘Pretenders of a Vile and Unmanly Disposition’:  
Thomas Hobbes on the Fiction of Constituent Power 
 
 
In chapter 18 of Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes described a group of seditious Presbyterians as 
‘pretenders…of a vile and unmanly disposition’.1 The source of Hobbes’s outrage was the contract 
that they purported to have constructed in service to their disobedience to the King. These 
arguments were a variation on early modern theories of constituent power, which Hobbes sought 
to reveal as a dangerous and underhand fiction that exploited the imagination of fellow believers. 
The recovery of Hobbes’s neglected condemnation of these Presbyterians, the Scottish Covenanters, 
has much to offer contemporary theories of constituent power. Constituent power commonly refers 
to the extra-institutional capacity of a group to establish or revise the basic constitutional conditions 
of a state. Among many contemporary democratic theorists, this is understood as a materialist 
potentia or a voluntarist capacity to enact change. Andreas Kalyvas, following Carl Schmitt, associates 
constituent power with the establishment of government through ‘human will’, analogous to 
‘physical natality’.2 Mark Wenman arrives at the same conclusion by following Antonio Negri. He 
defines it as a ‘capacity for innovation’, which he sharply distinguishes from ‘power qua right 
(potestas)’.3 As a dynamic capacity for innovation that might manifest either in the potential of a 
decentralised multitude, or a mode of insurgent citizenship, constituent power has become a pivotal 
instrument within the toolkit of political and legal theorists engaged in constitutionalism.4 Though 
these reflections have provided valuable reconsiderations of what might count as valid democratic 
activity, they also fix constituent power within relatively unchanging parameters, namely, as the 
vehicle for political contestation borne by the ostensible ‘creators’ of the state.  
The purpose of this article is to retrieve another way of thinking about constituent power. I 
argue that it is not a capacity for self-legitimising collective innovation, but serves as one tool among 
the many fictional components of our political language that contribute to the rich, layered thought-
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practices that comprise and pattern political thinking.  ‘Constituent power’ is a malleable element of 
our political vocabulary that, when incorporated into arguments, supplements and shapes partisan 
claims over the meaning and content of collective representative tropes, such as ‘the people’.  
This, I argue, is how Thomas Hobbes interpreted constituent power. In Leviathan, Hobbes 
intervened into debates over political supremacy among Presbyterian theologians, and, in doing so, 
disclosed an alternative conceptualisation of constituent power. Hobbes understood it not as a 
material power, but what he called a ‘fancy’. This was a flight of the imagination that ornamented 
motion with supplementary normative commitments that, when formulated as it was by the 
Presbyterians, could excite men into seditious acts. Though he intended to reveal the Presbyterian 
constituent power as a fiction, his aim was not deflationary. Hobbes harnessed the same tools for 
his own political project because he recognised the centrality of the imagination to maintaining the 
fictional attribution of political responsibility that allowed the state to exist.  
This article proceeds as follows: I first account for some contemporary interpretations of 
constituent power, with particular attention to how Hobbes’s work is used to distinguish it from 
sovereignty. Doing so will allow me in the later sections to sharpen part of the conceptual history 
of constituent power, which has been habitually understood to have emerged as a democratic 
counterpoint to Hobbesian absolutism.  One aim of this paper is to show that it has a more complex 
conceptual history, of which Hobbes is a central part. There is also much to be gained from 
interpreting Hobbes’s particular conception of constituent power. In addition to deepening our 
understanding of the political context within which Hobbes wrote Leviathan, Hobbes provided the 
additional theoretical apparatus to recognise constituent power as a particular type of claim capable 
of aiding a broad range of political purposes. To demonstrate this, I turn in the second and third 
sections to Hobbes’s account of imagination. Though this has much to say about Hobbes’s 
opposition to the scholasticism taught in the University,5 it is also pertinent to debates over the 
constituent power of the people that resurfaced among Scottish Presbyterians during the English 
Civil War. In the second section, I unpack Hobbes’s mechanistic theory of the imagination.  In the 
 - 4 - 
 
third, I show how this was used by Hobbes to defuse the Covenanter arguments that undermined 
the supremacy of the king, before using constituent power to supplement his account of 
representation for the purpose of obedience.  
This point is deepened in the final part of the article, where this argument is extended into 
contemporary debates. The core argument that I advance is that although constituent power is 
world-making, it does not denote a capacity for innovation—as is does for many contemporary 
democratic theorists. It is a world-making fiction. This deepens one aspect of the way in which 
peoplehood is understood. If images of peoplehood are constructed through claim-making, 
constituent power serves as one metaphor that shapes the various normative commitments of a 
group, substantiating who possesses political authority, the sorts of political actions that are 
legitimised by that authority, and the ends to which those actions should be directed.  
ON THE CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF CONSTITUENT POWER 
Thomas Hobbes is rarely read as a theorist of constituent power. Although Hobbes’s social 
contract appears to make foundational to the commonwealth by institution a body politic that is 
democratic in origin, there is some agreement that constituent power eludes the Hobbesian version 
of contractualism.6 Those that do recognise the place of Hobbes within its conceptual history 
interpret his absolutism as the foil against which an inchoate constituent power emerged in Early-
Modern Europe.7 As I will go on to argue in subsequent sections, this intuition is flawed because 
Hobbes is the antihero, not the villain, of this story. First, in this section, I show how modern 
scholars use Hobbes’s writing as a counterpoint in the conceptual history of constituent power in 
order to control its meaning as a brand of extra-constitutional collective agency. Though there are 
some quite significant disagreements among theorists of constituent power,8 these differences 
operate within relatively fixed parameters. In this section, I bring to light some ways in which these 
component assumptions are reproduced when positioning the genesis of constituent power as a 
response to Hobbes.  
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Andreas Kalyvas writes, ‘constituent power is the truth of modern democracy’. It is so because 
‘the birth of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty coincides with the conceptual advent of 
constituent power’.9 Here, Kalyvas advances two distinctive forms of origin claim. Constituent 
power is the truth of modern democracy because it resides at the origin of the modern political 
community—insofar as it is the power that establishes any particular democratic community. It is 
also the truth of modern democracy because, for Kalyvas, democracy is found at the conceptual origin 
of constituent power.10 What is notable about Kalyvas’s depiction is the implication that its 
historically ‘first’ articulation should have conceptual priority over its meaning. Here, he engages a 
rhetorical strategy that exploits the Aristotelian presumption that at an origin one finds the essence 
of an entity.11 This exploitation cements the relationship between a word—‘constituent power’—
and cluster of concepts—namely, an authentic, extra-constitutional collective capacity—by 
employing a privileged origin as a means of ‘decontesting’ the meaning of that word by ruling out 
alternatives and capturing it for a particular political programme.12  
In service to this argument, Kalyvas locates his origin of an inchoate constituent power in 
George Lawson’s Politica Sacra et Civilis, as a direct contrast—both conceptually and historically—to 
Hobbes’ Leviathan.13 Lawson’s distinction between majestas realis and majestas personalis proposed that 
‘real’ sovereignty, possessed by the community, was superior to the personal sovereignty of the 
constituted monarch.14 When framed as a response to Hobbes, Kalyvas portrays constituent power 
as a counter-tradition of modernity that represents an ‘alternative definition’ of political power 
exemplified by a capacity for creation and differs significantly from the paradigm of sovereignty-as-
command.15 To maintain this assertion, Kalyvas puts Lawson’s and Hobbes’s arguments to work in 
order to structure a conceptual bifurcation of political power: the transcendent command that 
underwrites the extant political regime, against the immanent creativity that ruptures it.16 Central to 
the decontestation of this conceptual bracketing is Kalyvas’s assertion that constituent power 
emerged in the wake of Hobbesian absolutism, and established a counter-tradition of modern 
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political power that tied Lawson to Locke, Paine, Sieyès, and even Schmitt, running parallel to 
sovereignty-as-command through the history of modern Western thought.17  
The plausibility of this interpretation is possible, in part, because Hobbes is marginalised 
within the genealogy, serving only as the absolutist foil against which arguments about constituent 
power were positioned. In doing so, Kalyvas and others sharpen the conceptual opposition between 
constituent power and sovereignty-as-command in order to celebrate the former and denounce the 
latter. Not only is this artificial distinction less tenable in light of recent scholarship that has shown 
the early modern theories of Bodin and Hobbes to be less absolutist than once presumed,18 it also 
occludes the varied ends to which constituent power has been used in the history of political 
thought.  
The intention of this article, then, is to challenge the conceptual backbone that contrasts 
constituent power with sovereign power by excavating a critical moment in its history. This moment 
is Thomas Hobbes’s engagement in Leviathan with the Scottish Presbyterians. Only Murray Forsyth 
has made the sustained attempt to portray Hobbes as a theorist of constituent power, though his 
argument operates through analogy by tracing the conceptual continuities between Hobbes and 
Emmanuel Sieyès.19 Mónica Brito Vieira, then, is quite right to challenge Forsyth’s imputation of 
Sieyès back into Hobbes.20 However, her conclusion that it is ‘misleading’ to describe Hobbes as a 
theorist of constituent power because his theory did not comprise the pre-legal collective subject that 
Sieyès’s did only repeats the assumption that constituent power is a collective will antithetical to 
representative politics. She excludes the possibility that Hobbes may have developed his own 
account that need not resemble Sieyès’s much later formulation. By Leviathan, Hobbes wished to 
debunk the view that a power was possessed immediately by a group such as the people. However, 
he wished to do so without abandoning the concept of constituent power. He did this by 
demonstrating that constituent power was nothing more than a label that designates a flight of the 
imagination that embellished political acts with the requisite normative commitments for either 
rebellion or obedience.  
 - 7 - 
 
HOBBES, IMAGINATION, AND SEDITION 
Imagination as a manifestation of sense perception was a topic to which Hobbes often 
returned, and out of more than mere scientific curiosity.21 In De Corpore, he provided a thought 
experiment in which we are to assume the annihilation of the world bar a single man. Supposing 
enough sensory data had made an impression upon his mind prior to this hypothetical annihilation, 
Hobbes argued that this man would still have access to a simulated world which, ‘though they be 
nothing but ideas and phantasms…they will appear as if they were external, and not at all depending 
upon any power of the mind.22 Imagination was, for Hobbes, a formidable fulcrum around which a 
political world pivoted. This was made clear in the closing pages of Leviathan, in which he analogised 
the Papacy to a ‘Kingdome of Fairies’. Just as fairies had ‘no existence, except in the Fancies of 
ignorant people’, so too, the power of the papacy was maintained only by fear-inducing imagery of 
dæmonology.23 Hobbes’s point was that the imagination was an aspect of mental cognition that 
could be strategically exploited to supplement basic physical powers for the purpose of securing 
obedience. Accordingly, in this section I show how Hobbes developed this argument to dispel the 
fantastic illusions that supported the power of the church. This is crucial to the position that I 
present in third part of the article, namely, that it was this deflationary approach to sæcerdotal power 
that Hobbes imported when responding to arguments about constituent power in Scottish 
Covenanter theology.  
Hobbes’s theory of the imagination was constructed as part of a sustained confrontation with 
the Aristotelian theories of sense perception that dominated late scholastic textbooks.24 Aristotelian 
sense perception hung on the potentiality-actuality distinction, whereby the object being perceived 
was thought to alter the sensory organ and actualise a potentiality within it.25 For example, the 
emission of the colour red from the sensible object also made the relevant sensory organ, the eye, 
red. This entailed the acquisition of the qualities of the perceptible essence without also acquiring 
the matter.26 Scholastic interpreters of Aristotle understood this to take the form of a ‘separated 
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essence’, which bore the qualities of the object from which they were emitted, activating the sensory 
faculties in the recipient.27  
Hobbes rejected the intuition behind scholastic sense perception. Hobbes was, after all, a 
materialist and a nominalist who believed nothing existed beyond the magnitude and motion of 
bodies.28 The doctrine of separated essences breached this materialism by presuming that something 
incorporeal could exist independently of matter. Influenced by the early modern scientific 
revolution, Hobbes devised his own account of sense perception that was not reliant upon emission 
of essences. This was explained according to the principles of mechanistic physics laid out in De 
Corpore, which subscribed to the basic principle that ‘all alteration is motion’.29 Sight, for instance, 
rather than qualitatively altering the eye, was simply explained as a local pressure exerted on the 
optical nerve. The sense organ did not receive the essence of the sensible object—colour, for 
Hobbes, was not inherent in the object—but was pressed by a motion or pulse of the sensible object 
that had been carried through a ‘diaphanous [though corporeal] medium’, such as air or water, 
causing the impression of colour in the observer.30  
With this mechanistic physics in place, Hobbes explained ‘imagination’ not as a distinct faculty 
of the mind that mediated between sense and intellect, as it was for the Scholastics, but only as the 
‘decaying sense’ that followed motion pressing upon the sensory organ.31 When pressure upon the 
sense organ is interrupted, motion within the sense organ may continue just as ripples continue 
across water even once a stone thrown into a pond has sunk to the bottom and ceased to move. 
The waning impression of something formerly perceived by the sense organ is the imagination, and 
this may be received in various ways. It may be ‘simple’, where the sensory data was received at once, 
as in the case of a horse, or it may be ‘compound’, where a new mental object is composed from 
various perceived objects, such as the image of a Centaur. A product of the compound imagination 
is ‘properly but a Fiction of the mind’.32  
Armed with a mechanistic account of the imagination, in chapter 46 of Leviathan Hobbes 
dismantled the ‘vain philosophy of Aristotle’ that inhabited the universities and the church. Hobbes 
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argument had an elegant simplicity. Motion was the first principle of physics, and motion was to be 
understood as change of place. Because incorporeal essences were not capable of place, they could 
not be capable of motion, and therefore could not exist. To suggest otherwise was to hypostatise 
words, which were nothing more than nominal labels that had left ‘an Impression in the 
Imagination’. Hobbes’s point was that abstract nouns were not an indication of a separated essence, 
but were only ‘signes, by which…wee conceive the Consequence of one name or Attribute to 
another’.33 The effect of this Scholastic ‘error’ was to presume the objective reality of incorporeal 
‘fancies’, such as ghosts, fairies and the ‘fabulous Doctrine concerning Dæmons’, all of which were 
‘but Idols, or Phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct from human 
fancy’.34 This did not diminish their importance. These compound images, or ‘fancies’ produced an 
affective ‘vibration’ within the observer’s body ‘in sympathy with the fancy,’ producing an emotive 
response that could strike fear or foster excitement in an individual.35 In its most insidious form, 
scholastic philosophy simply furnished a religious worldview in which it was possible to presume 
the persistence of the soul after death, and, with it, instil fear into citizens to obey the church over 
the state. 
These details are important because they demonstrate that Hobbes’s account of sense 
perception was not a technical exercise but was developed as part of a precise political engagement 
with the partisans of the civil war, and his materialist account of the imagination was a weapon he 
honed to fight that battle. Hobbes’s intention was not only to unmask the intellectual emptiness of 
the Church, but also to demonstrate the Church to be wilfully complicit in peddling seditious 
fictions.36 Hobbes believed that scholastic philosophy furnished various sets of insincere arguments 
that allowed the Church to secure obedience through fear-inducing mythology, and this, at the very 
bottom, had caused the civil war.37 More pointedly, it was Hobbes’s mechanistic understanding of 
the imagination that laid the groundwork upon which he was able to uncloak these church doctrines 
of dæmonology, the immortality of the soul, and, as I will show, constituent power, and to reveal 
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them as nothing more than myth-making exercises on the part of the Catholic and Presbyterian 
clergy.  
ON THE SEDITIOUS FICTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 
Though much has been written of Hobbes’s general critique of the scholastic ontology that 
undergirded the Catholic and Presbyterian churches,38 far less has been said about Hobbes’s 
treatment of particular instances of seditious speech and their effects. In Chapter 18 of Leviathan, 
‘Of the Rights of Soveraignes by Institution’, Hobbes drew attention to one such case, the writers 
of which he caustically labelled ‘vile and unmanly’ pretenders. These men were early theorists of 
constituent power who, much like the clergy who made use of the doctrine of separated essences, 
conjured a fanciful fiction for seditious ends. It was the fiction of a divine covenant: 
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new 
Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with 
God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but 
Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with 
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own conscience, that it is not only an act of an 
unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition.39 
Immediately apparent from this dense passage is Hobbes’s effort to deflate the divine covenant by 
transposing it from a material reality to the arena of the imagination: to claim a covenant immediately 
with God was to dishonestly conjure one in the mind. These pretenders were likely the Scottish 
Presbyterians, who agreed to the National Covenant of 1638 and entered into the Solemn League 
and Covenant with English Parliamentarians in 1643.40 One such Scottish Presbyterian was the 
pastor Samuel Rutherford, whose Lex, Rex was the ‘classic statement’ of Covenanter political 
thought.41 This was a deeply scholastic text, arranged along the lines of affirmation and refutation 
of a series of questions. Although written by a Presbyterian, the influence of the Salamancan neo-
Thomists bears this out.42 Therefore, while Rutherford has on occasion been grouped together with 
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the English Parliamentarians, such as Henry Parker,43 the explicitly theological nature of the 
argument placed him within a distinct political genre that produced a series of debates in lengthy 
theologico-political treatises that ran parallel to the shorter pièces d’occasion typical of civil war 
pamphleteering.44  
Lex, Rex was a reformed scholastic defence of the maxim ‘nam constituens est major constituto’, or 
‘the constituent is above that which is constituted’.45 This maxim was found in George Buchanan’s 
De Jure Regni, published some 65 years earlier, but had gained fresh audience following the National 
Covenant. It was against the bishop John Maxwell that Rutherford positioned his argument, in which 
he combined contractualism drawn from the Politica genre of the Holy Roman Empire with scripture 
to aid an account of the people’s power to constitute the monarch, and the corresponding power to 
depose at will.46 This cluster of concepts, which forms a contractualist variant of constituent power, 
had a far longer lineage in French and German Monarchomach thought,47 which Rutherford 
accessed through the jurist Johannes Althusius.48 Rutherford’s adjustments formed the basis of a 
distinctive covenanter theology against which Hobbes positioned a line of argument in Leviathan.49 
Rutherford’s dispute with Maxwell had centred upon the role played by ‘the people’ in the 
constitution of the monarch. The maxim supposed that, in constituting the monarch, the people 
were superior to their creation. Daniel Lee has framed this as a debate over the Roman Law principle 
of ‘divestiture’: whether the people’s original ‘donation’ of power was irreversibly given to the 
monarch.50 Though instructive, Lee’s position erodes a second argument which supplemented the 
Roman Law case. This was an ontological argument that addressed the status ascribed to the 
mediation of God’s acts in the establishment of monarchical office. Playing upon the Aristotelian 
schema of causes, John Maxwell had argued that an efficient cause—the entity which brings the 
effect into being—must contain the formal cause—the essence of the thing. If the monarch held 
power over life and death, this was not a power innately in the community, but one given by God. 
It followed, at least for Maxwell, that ‘the people [were] not the efficient and constituent of a king’, 
but only a tool of the efficient cause (i.e., God) to whom the power over life and death belonged.51   
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Rutherford’s response was more sophisticated than a simple rejection of divestiture. 
Rutherford initially agreed that individuals did not ‘have in themselves formally any ray of royalty or 
magistratical authority’, though he distinguished two acts in the creation of a monarch: the 
‘institution’ of the Office, and the ‘constitution’ of the person of that office.52 Whilst ‘God hath 
immediately by law of nature appointed that there should be a Government’, God ‘mediately defined 
by the dictates of natural light in the community, that there shall be one, or many Rulers to govern 
the community’.53 God did not partake directly in the act of constitution; to constitute was to 
designate the authority of God, but that act was one held completely in the body of the people.54  
For Rutherford, the power to constitute the person of the monarch was, in light of Maxwell’s 
objection, a clarification of the form of constituent power found earlier in Buchanan and Althusius. 
This presupposed a vertical covenant with God, the sort made explicit in Monarchomach thought, 
and according to which the powers of institution and constitution could be appropriately 
designated.55 It was only through their prior covenant with God that a people capable of constituting 
the monarch came into being, and so their obligation to God superseded their obligation to the 
King.56 In practice, the corresponding power to depose that which was constituted was not arbitrary, 
but circumscribed within Rutherford’s specifically Presbyterian considerations, and this meant that 
it was the duty of Charles I, as monarch of a Protestant nation, to act in accordance with the 
Protestant constitution.57  
Rutherford’s variety of constituent power narrated a joint enterprise entered into by king and 
people in order to defend the true religion. With it, the people’s obedience to the monarch extended 
only so far as it coincided with their duty to God. Hobbes objected to this doubled-barrelled aspect 
of covenant. In placing religious law above secular law, Rutherford provided justification to disobey 
the monarch in the name of extra-political duties. These duties were, for Hobbes, an extension of a 
supposed covenant with God, which was nothing more than a fantastic construct of the imagination 
made possible by exploiting the debris thrown up by Scholastic sense perception. The historical God 
of Leviathan was representational. Because Hobbes was a materialist, who believed nothing existed 
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beyond the motion and magnitude of bodies, he could have it no other way. God’s presence in the 
temporal world was possible only through an activity of personation whereby they could be 
materially represented by a living individual.58 This proposition turned Rutherford’s own language 
of ‘mediation’ on its head. Whereas, for Rutherford, God’s power to constitute the person to fill the 
office of monarch was ‘mediately’ designated by the people, Hobbes, in the same passage that he 
refers to these ‘pretenders’, co-opted this language, pressing that the historical God was possible 
only ‘by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person’. Hobbes point was that the 
inflection of Scholastic philosophy in Rutherford’s work had mistaken God’s incorporeity for a real 
quality within the world. From this premise, it became possible for the Covenanters to suppose an 
immediate contract with God, which, for Hobbes, was nothing more than a fiction contrived from 
an ill-fitting combination of scripture, the ‘vain and erroneous’ philosophy of Aristotle, and ‘fained, 
or uncertain history’.59  
The immediate covenant with God was not the only fiction at work in Rutherford’s argument, 
nor even the most important, but Hobbes was concerned that it laid the groundwork upon which a 
second fiction could be built that allowed Presbyterians to renege upon their duty of obedience to 
the monarch and justify their rebellion. This was the fiction of constituent power.  Power, for 
Hobbes, was to be explained in accordance with his mechanistic physics. As he made clear in De 
Corpore, power was a present or future capacity to motion that would produce an effect.60 And so, 
when in Leviathan Hobbes apportioned to ‘naturall power’ the categories of ‘prudence’, ‘eloquence’, 
and ‘liberality’, he intended that these were labels that described manifestations of material power.61 
In short, these were perceived effects brought about by immediate bodily motion. What Hobbes 
ruled out was the Aristotelian schema of causation that Rutherford had drawn upon to justify why 
the power to constitute ensured an ongoing superiority of constituent over constituted, and 
according to which the people retained the ability to dethrone the Monarch. This constituent power 
was not an effect of bodily motion, but what Hobbes called ‘insignificant speech’.62 Hobbes agreed 
that material and efficient causes exist, insofar as they corresponded to bodies and motions of 
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bodies, but he rejected formal and final causes, which were incompatible with the new mechanistic 
science.63 By rejecting essences and ends, Hobbes also revised the Scholastic worldview that made 
use of a perceived hierarchy intended to realise the immanent end of an object. Power was only the 
accident of a body, and could not be considered independent of that motion. Though one power 
may be lesser in skill or magnitude than another, it did not follow that there was an ongoing 
metaphysical priority of cause over effect or of one power over another without misconstruing the 
material way in which power was employed.64  
On this point, Hobbes’s target had been the Cardinal Bellarmine, who had defended the 
supremacy of the papacy over the temporal power of the monarch, but the argument cut through 
Rutherford’s constituent power too.65 Rutherford made use of Aristotelian causation in order to 
supplement an act of power—i.e., the constitution of the person of the monarch—with further 
unjustified ornamentation—i.e., the contention that the constituents retain the right to depose the 
monarch if in conflict with Presbyterian teachings. Constituent power was not a material power but 
operated on the register of compound imagination. It was a set of strategic political arguments that 
combined a series of innocuous experiences into a viscerally charged fanciful image, which set the 
terms for how a group could act. This was the source of Hobbes’s anger toward these ‘vile and 
unmanly’ pretenders. Rutherford did not formulate his argument as transparent, rational 
propositions over the rights and duties of citizens. Instead, he framed these rights in the naturalistic 
language of Aristotelian causation, presenting words as concrete things to shield them from dispute. 
For Hobbes, this was neither logical nor sincere, but a form of political subterfuge whose 
presentation played upon the passions of Presbyterians in order to excite them into sedition and 
convince them to betray civil authority in the name of a higher duty. 
My proposition, however, is not that Hobbes intended to conceive of a covenant without 
constituent power. After all, Hobbes was similarly dissatisfied with absolutist theories that took the 
proper relation between ruler and the people to be one of passive obedience.66 For Hobbes, 
Rutherford’s constituent power served as a metaphor through which the self-understanding of the 
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imagined collective was organised according to particular rules that shaped the behaviour, 
expectations and understanding of individuals within their political community, whose creation they 
participated in.67 Accordingly, Hobbes foresaw that an adequate response did not only debunk the 
Presbyterian constituent power, but harnessed this same imagination toward a different end, namely 
one that took the Kingdom of God to be nothing else but the Commonwealth itself.68  
With this in mind, an apparently unimportant choice of vocabulary in Leviathan has greater 
significance. Hobbes began chapter 18:  
‘A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every 
one, with every one, that whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the 
Right to Present the Person of them all’.69  
This passage occurs only a page before Hobbes’s scornful attack on the Scottish Covenanters, and 
was the conceptual cornerstone upon which he built that critique. The term ‘instituted’ was a fresh 
addition to Leviathan. In the corresponding passage from chapter VI of De Cive, written prior to the 
publication of Lex, Rex, Hobbes did not use the term, but instead chose ‘constitutionem’ to describe 
the nature of the covenant, which was translated in Charles Cotton’s 1651 English edition as 
‘constitute’.70 In the space of a page and a half, and without naming him, Hobbes had engaged three 
times with Rutherford’s argument: he denounced the covenanters as ‘pretenders’ for the contract 
they claimed with God; he sardonically adopted Rutherford’s own language of ‘mediation’ while 
turning that covenant on its head; and he revised the argument of De Cive, substituting ‘constitution’ 
for ‘institution in light of Rutherford’s distinction.  
There was a superficial sleight-of-hand at play in this final move, as his decision to replace the 
term ‘constitution’ with ‘institution’ allowed Hobbes to circumvent some of the more obvious 
objections associated with the maxim, ‘the constituent is greater than the constituted’. Nevertheless, 
there is more to the theoretical engagement than linguistic trickery. Though he wrote out the language 
of constituent power, the concept—at least as it appeared in Rutherford—was retained, though 
conjoined with the act of institution into a single covenant.71 Hobbes used representation to reframe 
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constituent power as a normative justification for obedience, and not sedition. This involved a 
conceptualisation of constituent power through which the claim to the title ‘constituent’ was present, 
though unvoiced and intentionally equivocal. This was because, for Hobbes, there was no collective 
known as ‘the people’, only the person of the state.72 Pace Brito Vieira, however, this does not mean 
that constituent power was absent, because for Hobbes it was not a pre-commitment device of a 
unified constituent will, but a set of imaginative political claims about the foundation of the state 
and the collective identity related to it.  
This entailed recasting the terms of Rutherford’s covenant in order to demonstrate that the 
three moments of contracting—the vertical covenant that made the people one before God; the 
institution of the office of the monarch by God; and the constitution of the person of the office by 
the people—were a single covenant of institution. Hobbes’s famous passage from chapter 17 reads: 
A Multitude of men are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, 
Represented…for it is the Unity of the Representer, not the unity of the Represented, that 
maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: 
And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude 73 
The unity of a group depended upon a representative who could ‘bear the person’ of that group, 
and this meant that only the act of institution between natural persons produced a collective identity. 
This was rooted in a provocative account of personhood that Hobbes thought necessary to serve 
his general purpose, namely, to ensure there was no collective identity separable from the sovereign 
and the state. Personhood was a juristic device through which Hobbes sought to make sense of how 
actions performed by a representative were to be attributed to the thing being represented.74 The act 
of personation involved the theatrical representation of a persona, and so to ‘bear one’s person’ was 
to represent the character of another.75 Because groups are composed of numerous individuals, 
Hobbes saw it necessary to introduce an intermediary ‘person’: the state, a character capable of 
representing the covenanting individuals as a single group. Therefore, through the act of institution, 
two persons were created: the state and the sovereign. In covenanting, the multitude were made a 
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unity when represented by the person of the state, which stood in place of the nominal label, ‘the 
people’.76  The state was a person ‘by fiction’; it was a construct and so lacked the rational capacity 
to take responsibility for actions attributed to it. As a construct, it could not speak or act. It therefore 
required another artificial person, the sovereign, to bear its person, and act on its behalf.  Hobbes 
theory of representation was the tool through which the state exhaustively served as the vessel of 
collective identity, and that its actions were performed only by the sovereign. This was because he 
believed that a group could act only through an individual representative, without which there was 
no way of allocating collective responsibilities to actions.77  
Forsyth has suggested the covenant gave ‘the unity latent in its multiplicity a distinct, 
appropriate, instituted shape and form’.78 This mistakes the direction in which Hobbes’s argument 
ran. It was not that the identity was latent, but that there was no collective identity prior to the 
covenant. The conceptual disconnection between the two was vital if Hobbes was to adequately 
diffuse the position of Rutherford, who assumed there was a body of the people. ‘The people’ of 
Lex, Rex breached the Hobbesian account of personhood because without a representative they 
formed an inchoate mass without a means of identifying a single will. By naming that collective ‘the 
people’, Rutherford was one of many writers who conflated the multitude of individuals with the 
description of a unified subject, an elision that made it impossible to adequately attribute actions to 
the collective.79  The key, for Hobbes, was the discontinuity between multitude and the state. There 
was no trace of a collective constituent subject prior to the covenant.80 The upshot was that the pre-
political entity that may have laid claim to acting as constituent power—that is, the multitude 
mistaken for a collective agent—ceased to exist following the creation of the state.  
In excluding the people as a unified collective within the state of nature, Hobbes presented an 
objection to Rutherford that held even in the terms of Rutherford’s own account of Aristotelian 
causation. The individuals who comprised the state held no authority over the person that was 
authored—namely the sovereign—because their collective identity did not temporally precede the 
creation of the commonwealth. In short, Hobbes account of representation fundamentally 
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reconfigured the image to which the label of constituent power could be attributed in two ways: 
first, the seat of collective identity was co-original with the person of the sovereign; second, the 
collective identity was capable of acting only through the person of the sovereign. The first point 
ensured the collective were not the constituents of the sovereign; the second ensured the act of 
institution invested them into an ongoing and active ‘authorisation’ (i.e. responsibility for the 
sovereign’s actions) through the person of the state.81  
This is a qualification upon Forsyth’s argument that Hobbes’s constituent power ‘acted once 
and only once’, having no life beyond the founding.82 The metaphor of constituent power, though 
intentionally difficult to pin down, served as the basis of a political imaginary by impressing upon 
the mind of the reader of Leviathan that, as authors of the state, they were not endowed with a 
capacity to dissolve it, but engaged in a continual joint-enterprise of authorisation. Through the 
person of the state, the individuals identified themselves as co-authors of the sovereign’s words and 
actions. Hobbes was vitally aware of the significance of this sort of symbolic attribution, for, as he 
wrote in Behemoth, ‘the power of the mighty hath no foundation except in the opinion and belief of 
the people’.83  The state itself existed only in the imagination of citizens whose individual practices 
allowed responsibility to be attributed from the sovereign to the state, and continued to exist only 
so long as they continued to buy into that fiction.84 Even when understood as a claim that pressed 
on the imagination, constituent power was world-making. This was not because the constituent’s 
fountain power was a substantive capacity of a group who bore it and were therefore capable of 
creating new constitutions, but because, for Hobbes, it was another of those conjured phantasms 
that assisted in forging the imagery of the political world towards which it was directed. In doing so, 
it forged the image of the Leviathan and the political obligations that followed from it. 
 
CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE IMAGINATION 
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Contemporary democratic theorists reproduce assumptions about constituent power that 
Hobbes had sought to debunk. Although there are important differences in the morphologies of 
contemporary arguments about constituent power when compared to Rutherford, each assumes it 
to be a privileged mode of collective action fundamentally separate from, and superior to, the 
institutional structure of the state. The excursion into Leviathan has sought to provide a different 
conclusion, namely that Thomas Hobbes argued that constituent power should not be understood 
as a capacity or physical power, nor a property of any sort, but as a nominal label that is mobilised 
as part of a partisan claim to forge a new common inferential framework from which citizens can 
draw.85 By using Hobbes’s challenge to Rutherford, my intention has been to throw into sharper 
relief the variety of ways in which constituent power can be employed in the process of political 
argument, and the variety of ends to which it can be directed.  In challenging the orthodoxy around 
constituent power, I have disputed the assumption that it is the uncontested property of a 
democratic collective. Instead I have provided a wider analytical lens that sheds light on how 
constituent power is used as a genre of claim-making within political discourse.  
When understood, as it was for Hobbes, as a partisan claim that leans on the imagination, 
constituent power should be seen as a component of political arguments through which the 
individual intends to secure a form of political authority for themselves or the group on behalf of 
whom they speak; its meaning is made more malleable, and it is opened to political contestation with 
a range of effects. For instance, a claim about the meaning and content of constituent power might 
determine a status (one is the constituent power), or it might identify a property, a capacity or a right 
(one has constituent power). It is able to draw and redraw the boundary that demarcates the people. 
It is also able to attach privilege to other forms of collective agents of varying scales and composition 
(such as the state, the nation, the party, or the multitude) or individuals who may act on their behalf 
(for instance, the sovereign, the dictator, or the Reichspräsident). These claims, as Hobbes showed, 
also substantiate further criteria, namely, how, when, where and to what end it is appropriate for 
these groups to engage in political action: they might lay the justificatory groundwork for rebellion 
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or ensure obedience; these arguments might demarcate the appropriate subject of constitution-
writing,86 or channel collective action toward the symbolic acclamation of a strong leader;87 they may 
even be distanced from collective acts, and associated with the capacity of the sovereign to select 
ministers to govern.88 How collective agency is shaped and where it is channelled depends upon the 
constructed morphology of constituent power, as well as how that morphology is advanced in 
argument.89 The prevailing interpretation that defines constituent power as a capacity is only one 
among many variations. To interpret it as an imaginative fiction is to observe with a wider-angle 
analytic lens capable of grappling more effectively with the differences between the diverse 
formulations of collective agency available to those who make use of constituent power.  
Constituent power is capable of being used in this way because it is a particularly important 
type of claim. This is not because constituent power designates an exceptional or extraordinary 
activity but because it is a significant nodal point within the constellation of concepts that inform 
the construction of a collective identity, insofar as constituent power is itself often connected to the 
origin of something pertinent to that identity (such as the legal system that institutionally constrains 
it). Convincing others about the ownership of that origin, however elusive or insecure, assists in the 
distribution of political capital. In short, a partisan depiction of constituent power serves as a fulcrum 
within a political imaginary around which political space is organised, substantiating, among other 
things, who possesses authority (insofar as collective agents can be composed in various ways), the 
sorts of political action that authority can legitimise and the end to which those actions are to be 
directed.  
This is to revise the relationship between constituent power and the imagination. It is not to 
present the imagination as a constituent power—as an infinitely creative political impulse90—but to 
present constituent power as a fiction of the imagination—as a fiction aspect of the shared symbolic 
world in which we live. Accordingly, although the imagination provides manifold ways of instituting 
a symbolic world, for a claim over the meaning and content of constituent power to be successful, 
it must be accepted by an audience. This exposes both the strength and the vulnerability of Hobbes’s 
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presentation of constituent power as a fiction. The danger was that by exposing the inner workings 
of the imagination, Hobbes risked weakening the persuasive force behind his own efforts to press 
the same passionate triggers in his audience. Hobbes was attuned to this danger. He was, after all, 
well-versed in the art of rhetoric and sensitive to how arguments were to be presented in such a way 
that they would be received with acceptance. Hobbes shored up his own position by ensuring his 
account of personation was consonant with his materialist teardown of the imagination. Under the 
principles of his mechanistic physics, fictional persons, such as the state, were possible only when 
represented by a human capable of rational action. Hobbes openly avowed the artificiality of this 
representation,91 and wilfully embraced that he was fighting one fiction with another. His wager was 
that if one were to accept his critique of the imagination, his account of personation was the only 
adequate alternative for collective representation.  
It is on this point that modern scholarship is less attentive. When constituent power is closely 
associated with a capacity belonging to the people, the broader phenomenon of how these claims are 
constructed, advanced and legitimated is occluded. This is detrimental, because it masks those 
instances where claims over constituent power are hijacked (as Hobbes’s own argument does), or 
simply misfire. Among contemporary theorists, one tendency is to argue that when hijacked, one is 
no longer dealing with constituent power.92 This is evident even in Jason Frank’s excellent 
assessment of the use of imagination in the Federalist Papers. Frank sees constituent power lacking 
in the writings of the Anti-Federalists due to their demand that the constitution was authorised by 
the signature ‘We, the States’ rather than ‘We, the People’.93 Although Frank is very much aware of 
how the imagination produces the requisite symbolism through which a crowd understand 
understands itself as one, he combines this with a foundational assumption that pins constituent 
power to a particular collective agent. When circumscribed in this way, scholarship is less attentive 
to the way constituent power is constructed in confrontation between partisans, and it is less 
responsive to hijackings and misfirings. Hobbes aids us with this problem, because he recognised 
the surprising flexibility of constituent power, and this rendered it a battle over words. He was 
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cognisant that he was a partisan in that battle, and this required both the tactical awareness and the 
ability to respond to how one’s opponents had tapped into the imagination of their audience.  
CONCLUSION 
The intention of this article has been to shed some light on the conceptual history of 
constituent power with an eye toward how this conceptual history can unsettle the received view of 
constituent power in contemporary democratic theory. Against the prevailing view that constituent 
power is the extraordinary concrete capacity of a collective to found a constitution, I have sought 
to show that it is a genre of political claim-making. My excavation of Hobbes’s sometimes opaque 
challenge to the Presbyterians has aided this argument. 
Hobbes appreciated that one prominent aspect of political power entailed convincing one’s 
audience of ownership of that power, and this involved myth-making and fiction-writing.94 
Constituent power was one such device through which this could be achieved. For Hobbes, the 
Presbyterians who made use of arguments about constituent power were engaged in an exploitative 
enterprise that placed in the minds of believers an understanding that they possessed a right to 
challenge or disobey sovereign command that followed from their power to constitute him. This, 
for Hobbes, was derived from a flawed interpretation of sense perception that ascribed a reality to 
immaterial things. The arguments that individuals could be united as a people through an immediate 
contract with God, that their collective action could constitute a monarch, and that in being the 
cause of that monarch, they held authorial power over their creation, were, for Hobbes, constructs 
of the imagination that ornamented physical actions of individuals with supplementary normative 
imagery that excited citizens into sedition. This was because constituent power was a metaphor 
through which groups understood the range of possible actions available to them. Though he 
intended to reveal the ‘fancy’ of the Presbyterian constituent power, he also harnessed it for his own 
political project because he recognised that imagination was central in maintaining the fictional 
attribution of political responsibility that allowed the state to exist.  
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Accordingly, I have argued that constituent power should not be understood as the collective 
capacity for innovation, but as a ‘fiction’ that accords us the means to imagine ourselves within 
political communities. One may reply that it is patently fictive insofar as it is an element of language, 
and the same could be said of all language. My proposition is finer than this. The content of that 
fiction is important, as is the practice of its construction. The label ‘constituent power’ is not only a 
scholarly ‘placeholder for worthy practices’ of extra-institutional participation.95 As Hobbes 
demonstrated, it is also a partisan construction. Political theorists must be more attentive to how the 
meaning of ‘constituent power’—and not only peoplehood—is formed at the vernacular level in aid 
of particular political causes. This point is left under-theorised when constituent power is associated 
with a relatively unchanging form of political agency that varies only according to the political actor 
to which it is ascribed. In constructing to these images, and those images being accepted, one creates 
a social world complete with constitutive rules, a location of authority, and a place for living. This is 
a world-constituting act even if this is orthogonal to how constituent power is commonly 
understood to create social identities. The meaning of constituent power supplements the names of 
political collectives with the normative ornamentation, establishing why ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ 
bears weight. The normative significance ascribed to ‘the people’ is not self-evident; it is formed 
through laying claim to constituent power. 
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